is
- containment-first observation
- disposable sandbox plus separate sink
- encrypted, provenance-oriented evidence
- a review-gated pilot foundation
prototype / demo
contained observation for hostile web payloads
DetCordon places a disposable victim behind a DetectionOnly HTTP tap. Events and encrypted samples leave the sandbox for an audited sink on a separate host.
No production or formal sandbox-escape assurance is claimed.
01
sandbox host
disposable victim / detection-only tap
02
sink host
digest / encrypt / audit / retain
current system
observe the interaction; separate the evidence
-
01
allow
The DetectionOnly tap records request metadata while the hostile interaction continues.
-
02
constrain
The victim runs in time-boxed Docker or Firecracker isolation with default-drop egress.
-
03
separate
Telemetry and sample uploads use distinct channels. Bodies do not travel in event records.
-
04
preserve
The sink computes SHA-256, age-encrypts samples, audits writes, and emits offline-verifiable bundles.
operating boundaries
explicit scope, explicit residual risk
Containment depends on live-host configuration, kernel isolation, physical sink separation, and operator discipline. Those remain part of every deployment review.
is not
- a blocking WAF
- a promise that hostile code is safe
- an unauthenticated public sandbox
- a formal proof of isolation
diligence trail
security review is part of the product
A finding closes only when implementation enforces the boundary, a regression proves rejection, and generated defaults agree. Current status belongs in the repository register, not a static marketing number.
managed pilot
start with topology and trust gates
A useful pilot defines workload class, evidence retention, analyst access, success criteria, and remediation gates before hostile workloads are introduced.
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